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1. Introduction 
An experiment is to be performed, whose possible outcomes are 
the e lements of a se t X. The parameter space 0 i ndexes a family 
of probability distribut i ons on X· , each element e in 0 corresponds 
to a possible state of nature, and the distribution p0 i ndexed by 
e descri bes the stochastic structure of the experiment, if e obtains. 
An inference q is a func tion , which ass i gns to every x in X a 
probability distribution qx on 0 An i nference might correspond 
to a system of confidence intervals, a posterior distribution, or a 
fiducial distr i bution. 
An inference q can be given an operational interpretation, as 
follows: qx may be viewed as a conditional odds function, which the 
inferrer uses to post odds on subsets of 0 after seeing x. Following 
Freedman and Purves (1969) and Cornfield (1969), the inferrer or his 
inference q i s called coherent if it is impossible for a gambler 
to devise a system based upon q, which consists of placing a finite 
number of bets on subsets of 0 after x is observed and which 
attains an expected payoff greater than some positive constant for 
every possible state of nature e. (See Heath and Sudderth (1978) for a 
precise definition of coherence . ) 
Heath and Sudderth (1978) showed that coherent inferences correspond 
to posterior distributions of proper, finitely additive priors on 0. 
Now there are technical difficulties involved in employing finitely 
additive distributions which are not countably additive. For exampl e , 
such priors may fail to yi eld posteriors; and even if posteriors exist 
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for. a. finitely additive prior, there may be no available algorithm, 
corresponding to Bayes' Theorem, for computing them. The setting in 
which Heath and Sudderth worked was very general: 0 and X are 
arbitrary sets, and no compatibility or continuity conditions are 
imposed upon the p 's e or the q 's • X Most common inferential 
problems have much more structure than this. Thus, it is natural 
to ask: in the kind of problems usually encountered in statistical 
practice, is every coherent inference available as the posterior 
calculated from a proper, countably additive prior? The answer to 
this question is evidently no: for example, if 0 = X = R1 , 
Pe is N(8,1), and qx is N(x,1), then the inference q is 
----------~ ----------
coherent by [Heath and Sudderth (1978), Example 4.1], but it is not 
derivable from any proper countably additive prior on 0. 
The main purpose of this paper is to describe a fairly general 
inferential setting in which all coherent inferences can be obtained 
as posteriors from proper, countably additive priors. First, suppose 
both 0 and X are separable metric spaces. Second, suppose each 
and each q are countably additive. 
X 
Third, suppose the P's e 
and the q's are both weakly continuous. These three conditions 
X 
are not enough, as the example of the preceding paragraph shows; note, 
however, that virtually all the classical problems of statistical 
inference satisfy them. Finally suppose 0 or X is compact: 
corollary 3.1 asserts that this, together with the three previous 
conditions, assures that all coherent inferences are posteriors from 
proper, countably additive priors. Many standard inferential settings 
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satisfy the f our conditions. For example, suppose 0 is the closed 
unit interval, and the experiment consists of one of t he usual ways 
of repeating bernoulli trials ( n repetitions, perhaps, or sampling 
th 
unti l the m s uccess): see examples 3.1 and 3 . 2 for a discussion. 
Or again, suppose the experiment consists of observing a collection of 
uniformly trunca t ed s urvival times , with any standard life-testing 
parametric model: the uniform truncation gives a compac t X. 
The next section contains some preli minary ma t eria l and introduces 
a notion of consistency of a sampling model with an inference. I t turns 
out tha t consis tency is equivalent to coherence (Proposition 2 .1) and 
i s al so equiva l ent t o an absence of " strong incons i s t ency" in the 
sense of Stone (1976) (Proposition 2.3). The study of consistency may 
be of independent interes t giving, as it does, conditions for the 
exi s t ence of a joint distribution with given condit i onal distributions. 
The major mathematical t ool use d throughout is the s epar a ting 
hyperplane theorem which was fi r st used in a similar context by 
Freedman and Purves (1969) and s ubsequently by Buehler (1965) , Heath and 
S~dderth (1972 , 1978), and Quiring (1972) . 
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2. Coherence and consistency. 
For any set S, P(S) denotes the collection of finitely additive 
probability measures defined on all subsets of S. If ~ is a bounded, 
real-valued function defined on S and y E P(S), then the Y-integral 
of ~ will be written Y-(~), J~dy, or J~(s)y(ds). 
Let 0 and X be nonempty sets to be regarded as the sets of 
possible states of nature and possible observations. A·sampling model 
p is a mapping which assigns to each 8 E 0 an element p8 of P(X), 
and an inference q assigns to each x EX an element of P(0} 
Thus p is a conditional distribution on X given 0 and q is a 
conditional distribution on 0 given X. 
Let r E P(0 x X) and define the marginals n and m of r by 
1T (A) = r (A x X) 
m (B) = r (0 x B) 
AC 0 , 
BCX 
Let B(~) and B(X) be a-fields of subsets of 0 and X, 
respectively, and let B = B(0) x B(X) be the product a-field. 
Roughly speaking, p and q are called consistent if they are 
the conditional distributions corresponding to some joint distribution 
r. Here is the precise definition. 
Definition. p and q are consistent if there exists r E P(0 x X) such. 
that, for every bounded, B - measurable function ~: 0 x X--. R, 
(2.1) r(~) = Jp8 (~8 )11(98) 
= Jq (~x)m(d~) 
X 
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Here rn () rn(e ) and ,nx(8) = rn( e ,x) , '+'S X = '+' ,X '+' '+' for all (6, x ) € 0 x X • 
If no such r exists, p and q are inconsistent. 
Note: The primary reason for introducing a - fields is that, very often, 
p a nd q are na turally given as countably additive probabilities on s ome 
particular a - field (as when p6 is N(6,l) on the Borels of R
1): it is 
then reasonable to ask for consistency relative only to the naturally def ined 
parts of thes e distributions, rather than to the more or less arbitrary 
extensions to all subsets. 
Notice that, if r,p,q satisfy (2.1), then the marginals TI and 
m satisfy 
(2.2) 1T ('¥) = fq ( '¥ ) m(dx) 
X 
when '¥ : 0 , R is bounded , B( 0) - measurable and '¥ ~ 
B(X) - measurable. 
X ~ R is bounded, 
The proposition below states that coherence as defined in Heath and 
Sudderth (1978) and consistency a re essentially the same concepts . 
Proposition 2.1 . q is coherent for a gi ven p if and only if 
p and q are consistent. 
Proof : If q is cohe rent for p, then, by [Heath and Sudderth (1978)), 
Corollary 1), there i s a TI f P( 0) s uch that q is the posterior corresponding 
to TI . Take r to be the measure defined by the f irst equality of (2.1). 
Conversely, if p and q are consistent and r is as in the 
definition of consistency, then q is clearly the posterior of TI 
the margina l of r on 0. 
The nex t proposition gives several conditions equi valent t o 
consistency which will be used in the sequel . 
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Proposition 2.2. The condit i ons below are equivalent. (In (b), (c), 
and (d), ~ 0 x X ~ R is assumed t o be bounded and B - measurable.) 
(a) p and q are consistent. 
(b) For all ~ 
(c) For all ~, inf {q (~x) - fp 0 (~ )q (dx) } < 0 X 0 X 
X 
(d) There exist TI E P(0) , m E P(X) s uch t hat, for all ~ , 
Proof: It will be shown that a ~ b ~ d ~ a There is no diffic ul ty 
in replacing condition b by the symmetric condition c . 
a~ b Let r be as in the definition of consistency 
and let TI, m be its marginal s. Set 
(2. 3) 
By (2 . 2) and (2.1), 
1T ( '¥ ) = f p e (~e) 7T (d0) - f qx(~x) m(dx) 
= r(~) - r(~) 
0 • 
Thus, inf'¥ cannot be positive . 
b ~ d. Let C be the col l ection of a l l functions '¥ as in (2 . 3) . 
Because C i s convex, it fo llows f rom a standard separation theorem [Dunford 
and Schwartz (1958 ), p. 417] or more directly from Lemma 1 of Heath and Sudderth 
(1978), that there is a TI in P(0) s uch that TI('¥)_.:. 0 for all '¥ E C. 
But '¥ e C ~ -'¥ e C. So TI ('¥) = 0 for '¥ e C : that is, for all 
bounded B-measurable e, 
Now define m by t he second equality of (2.2) . So (*) is (d). 
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d =>a. Define r by the first equality of (2.1) for every 
bounded ~ : 0 x X ~ R . By (d), the X- marginal of r is m. That the 
second equality of (2.1) holds fo r all ~ also fol l ows from (d). o 
Following Stone (1976), define p and q to be strongl y inconsistent 
if there is a bounded, B - measurable f unc tion ~: 0 x X ~ R such that 
(2. 4) X slip q (~ ) . 
X 
X 
This condition states that the conditional expectations of ~ given 
e are uniformly larger than those given x. 
Proposition 2 . 3. p and q are strongly inconsistent if and only if 
p and q are inconsistent . 
Proof: Suppose p and q are not strongly inconsistent and let C be 
the collection of all functions '¥ on 0 x X defined by 
'¥ ( 0, x) X q (~) 
X 
fo r some bounded, B - measurable ~ 0 x X ~ R. Since (2 . 4) does 
not hold, 
inf '¥ ( 0, x ) inf X = p0 (~0) - s up qx (~) ~ 0 ' e ,x e X 
for every '¥ E C . By Lemma 1 of Heath and Sudderth (1978), there is a mea-
sur e y E P(e xx) s uch that y('¥) > 0 for all '¥ E C. But '¥EC=> - '¥ E C 
and so y('¥) = 0 for all '¥ E C. Thus, for every '¥ , 
y.('Y) = 
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where n and m are the marginals of y on 0 and X, respectively. 
Hence, the second equality of (2.1) holds for all bounded, measurable 
~, and r can be defined by the first equality of (2.1) for all bounded 
~. This proves that p and q are consistent. 
For the converse, notice that (2.4) implies that the second equality 
of (2.1) fails for every n and m. a 
Several interesting examples of strong inconsistency and, therefore, 
of inconsistency and incoherence are in Stone (1976). 
3. Continuous inferences. 
For the rest of the paper, 0 and X are assumed to be separable 
metric spaces with B(0) and B(X) their a-fields of Borel subsets. 
Hence, the product a-field B = B(0) x B(X) is the a-field of 
Borel subsets of 0 x X [Parthasarathy (1967), Theorem 1.10]. Let M(0) and M(X) 
denote the sets of countably additive probability measures on B(0) 
and B(X) , respectively. A measure ~ in P(0) (respectively P(X) ) 
whose restriction to B(0) ( B(X)) is countably additive, will, for 
simplicity, be identified with that restriction. 
It will also be assumed from now on that p and q are continuous 
mappings from 0 to M(X) and X to M(0) , respectively, when M(X) 
and M(0) are given the usual weak topology (as defined in section 
II. 6 of Parthasarathy (1967)). This assumption of continuity seems 
quite mild since, to our knowledge, all of the classical likelihoods 
and inferences satisfy it. Notice that p and q are, in particular, 
regular conditional distributions, which is equivalent to saying they 
are Borel measurable mappings. 
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Two technical lemmas are needed. In the first lemma, the metric 
d on 0 x X is taken to satisfy 
(3.1) d ( (a, x) , ( e"", x) ) = p ( e, e .... ) 
where p is the metric on 0. For example, one could take 
d ( (8,x) , (8"",x"")) = p(8,8"") + ~ (x,x"") 
where T is the metric on X. 
Lemma 3.1. Let q>: 0 x X-+ R be bounded and uniformly continuous. 
Then the functions and X X-+ q (q>) 
X 
are continuous too. 
Proof: Let a -+a. 
n 
It suffices to show Pa (q,9 ) -+ P8 (~8) • n n 
By (3.1), (8 ,x)-+ (8,x) uniformly in x and, hence, 
n 
q>(8 ,x)-+ q,(8,x) uniformly in x. 
n 
Now write 
= 
+[Jq,(8 ,x)p9 (dx) - Jq,(8 ,x) p8 (dx)] • n 
The first bracketed expression on the right converges to zero because 
q,(9 ,x) -+ q,(8,x) uniformly in x ; the second expression converges to 
n . 
zero because weakly. 
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a 
-Let C (0) be the collection of bounded , rea l - valued continuous 
functions defined on t he metric space 0 , and give C(0) its sup 
norm topology . 
Lemma 3.2 Asswne 0 is compact and let C be a convex s ubse t 
of C(0) . Then the following a r e equivalent: 
(i) inf ~< 0 for all ~ € C . 
(ii) There exists a TI i n M(0) such that TI(~) < 0 
for all ~ € C. 
Proof: The proof is similar to tha t of Lemma 1 in Heath and Sudderth (1978) 
and uses a separat ing hyperplane theorem [Dunford and Schwartz (1958) , p . 417] 
together with Ri esz's Theorem [Parthasarathy (1967), Theorem II 5 . 8] which 
characterizes the nonnegative, normed linear f unctionals on (0) as the 
elements of M(0) • 
Proposition 3.1. If p and q are continuous and 0 is compact, then 
the following are equivalent. 
(3.2) 
(a) p and q are consistent. 
(b) For every bounded, uniformly continuous function 
~: 0 x X ~ R, 
inf {p 6 (~6) - fqx (~x) p6 (dx)} < o . e 
(c) There exist TI € M(0) , m € M(X) s uch tha t, for every 
bounded, Borel measurable function 
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D 
Furthermore, (a) and (c) remain equivalent if the hypothesis that 
0 is compact is replaced by one that X is compact. 
Proof: That a~ b and c ~ a follows from Proposition 2.2. 
b~c The proof is similar to the proof that b ~ d in 
Proposition 2.2. Use Lemma 3.1 to show that, for bounded uniformly 
continuous <.p, the ~ defined by (2.3) is in C(e) and then use 
Lemma 3.2 to find 'fT E M(0) so that n(~) ~ 0 and, hence, n(~) = 0 
for all ~ corresponding to a bounded, uniformly continuous <.p. If 
m is defined by (2.2), then (3.2) holds for all such <.p. But two 
countably additive probability measures which agree on the bounded, 
uniformly continuous functions must agree on all bounded Borel functions 
[Theorem II.5.9 of Parthasarathy (1967)]. 
The final assertion of the proposition is obvious because of the 
symmetry of conditions (a) and (c) in 8 and x. 
Corollary 3.1. Suppose p and q are continuous and either 0 or X 
a 
is compact. Then q is coherent for p if and only if q is the 
pos.terior of a prior 'fT E M(0) (i.e. a proper, countably additive prior). 
Proof: Suppose q is coherent for p. By Proposition 2.1, p and q 
are consistent. By Proposition 3.1 (part(c)), q is the posterior for 
a 'fT E M(0) • 
The opposite implication is immediate from Proposition 2.1. a 
---------~---~ -
Here are two examples, both concerning inference about the probability 
of success in Bernoulli trials, which illustrate the application of 
Corollary 3.1. 
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Example 3.1: Suppose x represents the number of successes in n 
Bernoulli trials, and 8 is the probability of success in a single trial. 
Thus 
X = {O,1, ••• ,n} , 
and 
For each x, l is a polynomial of degree n, 
X 
and so p is certainly 
weakly continuous. Since X has the discrete topology, any inference q 
is weakly continuous. And since X is finite, it is compact, so Corollary 
3.1 applies. 
Suppose 0 is the open interval (0,1): this choice of parameter 
space reflects the judgement that the experiment is not purely deterministic, 
and both success and failure may be observed. With this choice of parameter 
space, each x in X receives positive probability under each 9 in 0. 
' By Corollary 3.1 and Bayes Theorem, then, every coherent inference for this 
problem can be expressed as 
l (9)µ(d9) 
X 
(3.2) q (d9) = 
X fl dµ 
X 
for some countably additive probability measure µ on 0. 
A consequence of this result is that improper Bayesian inferences 
are incoherent for this problem. Here, improper Bayesian inference refers 
to the following procedure: select a countably additive measure µ on 
the Borel subsets of 0 with infinite total mass; define 
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q by Bayes' 
X 
formula (3.2) when the denominator is finite and define qx to be an 
arbitrary element of M( 0) otherwise . Such a q cannot be the inference 
corresponding to any pr oper, countably additive v unless fl dµ 
X 
inf inite for a l l x. For suppose tha t integral is f inite. Then 
given by (3. 2) and cannot be the measure 
l (6)v(d6) 
X 
J l dv 
X 
beca use , fo r exampl e , .c1 has finite integral for this measure 
X 
for q . By Corollary 3 .1 then, this improper inference must be 
X 
A common choice of µ is 
(3. 3) 1 ec1-e) de 
is 
is 
but not 
incoherent. 
see, fo: example Jeffreys (1961) or J aynes (1968) . Now an ac tua l improper Bayesian, 
like Jeffreys, would not, if he chose the prior in (3. 3), selec t any mea sure 
in M( 0) as his inference if x were O or n. Rather, he would declare 
an improper posterior. The point we are making here is that he could not 
modify the formal posterior computed from s uch improper priors as those 
in (3.3) by sel ecting and from M(0), so as t o produce a 
coherent inference. 
Exampl e 3.2: x and the same as in example 3.1; but 0 is the closed 
interval [ 0, 1] . Suppose the improper Bayesian s elec ts (3. 3) as his "prior", 
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and uses its formal posterior, modified as follows : 
l c(x)8x- l(l- 8)n- x- l f or 1 < X < n- 1 
qx (0) = 00 for X = 0 
01 for X = n . 
This i nf erence is now coherent, as it is a posterior f or the proper , 
coun t ably additive prior 
or any prior concen tra ted on {0,1}. 
This example illustrates the fac t that coherence may provide a 
necessary condition fo r reasonable inference, but is not sufficient. The 
inferrer with prior concentrated on {0 ,1 } is free to be stupid should 
at leas t one success and one failure occur. 
If neither 0 nor X i s compact, but the other hypotheses of this 
section remain in force, then a continuous q is coherent for a 
continuous p if and only if q is the posterior of a finitely 
additive TI which is regular on the f ield E generated by the closed 
subsets of 0 . (The proof is s imilar to that given above. However, 
the c r ucial separation argument of Lemma ?· 2 uses the fact that t he 
nonnegative, normed linear functionals on C(0) are the regular n ' s 
[Dunford and Schwartz (1958), p . 262]) . Such a TI , i.e . one regular on the 
field E, is countably additive when restricted to subsets of a compact set . 
Thus any failure of TI to be countably additive must occur on unbounded sets 
and is linked to the tail behavior of TI. 
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One of the hypotheses of this section, which has not been emphasized, 
is that all of the measures qx are countably additive. If, instead, 
they are allowed to be finitely additive and if the space P(0) is given 
an appropriate topology, a purely finitely additive prior TI can 
lead to a continuous q. Here is a trivial example: let 0 = [0,1], 
and suppose Yo is a diffuse point mass at 0, and y1 is a diffuse point 
mass at 1. (That is, Yo (A)= 1 for A any interval containing O, 
but Yo {O} = 0; and similarly for y1,) Let Now, 
suppose X = {O, 1}, and p8 ( {O}) = 1 - p8.( {l}) = 6 • Finally, suppose 
and Trivially, q is a continuous inference. Also, 
q is a posterior for the purely finitely additive prior TI, but q is 
not the posterior for any countably additive prior. 
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